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Current Opinion in Psychology

Review

Social consequences of emotional expressions in negotiation

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Negotiation is integral to social life. Whether we focus on exchanges between individuals, groups, organizations, or nations, negotiation is the most common and constructive way of making deals and solving disputes. Negotiations can spark intense emotions, which in turn shape negotiation processes and outcomes. Here, we review research on the social consequences of emotional expressions in negotiation. We summarize evidence regarding specific single emotions (e.g., anger, happiness, disappointment, sadness, fear, guilt, shame, pride, hope) as well as alternative (patterns of) emotional responses (e.g., empathy, emotional ambivalence, mixed emotions, alternating emotions, indifference) across levels of analysis (interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup). Our review indicates that emotions can have both favorable and unfavorable consequences, depending on critical moderators (e.g., information processing, perceived appropriateness) and the focal criterion (e.g., monetary gains, social outcomes). The richness of the empirical record underlines the importance of investigating discrete emotions (rather than positive vs. negative affect) and defies simple conclusions about the (dys)functionality of emotions. Emotional expressions can help or hurt negotiators' outcomes depending on goal prioritization (e.g., maximizing individual outcomes vs. maintaining positive relations) and the social context. We call for research outside the lab to gain insight into real-world consequences of emotional dynamics in (intergroup) negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy.

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Current Opinion in Psychology 2027, **73**:102424

This review comes from a themed issue on Current Directions and New Horizons in Negotiation Research

Edited by Maurice Schweitzer, Brian Gunia and Nazli M Bhatia

For complete overview about the section, refer Current Directions and New Horizons in Negotiation Research

Available online 27 August 2026

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2026.102424

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This work was supported by an Open Competition grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO; grant number 406.21.GO.002) awarded to Gerben A. van Kleef.

Background

Social life is rife with disagreements, many of which can be addressed through negotiation. Whether we consider a buyer and seller bargaining about the price of a car, neighbors quarreling over the acceptable volume of a TV at night, business partners settling the dissolution of their joint venture, politicians debating investments in renewable energy, or leaders of nations at war discussing the terms of a cease fire, negotiations are key to addressing (apparently) divergent interests [1]. As a means of dealing with disagreement and conflict, negotiation is an inherently emotional process, and the emotions that arise in this process can have a pervasive impact on the trajectory and outcomes of negotiations [2,3].

Early studies uncovered that negotiation behavior is shaped by negotiators' affective *experiences*, with positive affect stimulating cooperation [4] and negative affect competition [5]. Subsequent work showed that discrete negative emotions have differential effects on behavior, with anger predicting offer rejection [6], guilt predicting cooperation [7], and anxiety predicting lower first offers and worse outcomes [8].

Reflecting the fundamental insight that emotions are inherently social phenomena [9,10], a compatible line of inquiry addresses the consequences of emotional *expressions* in negotiations. Here, we provide an integrative review of this literature. In doing so, we focus on the consequences of expressions of discrete emotions [11], rather than diffuse positive or negative affect [12,13]. This focus echoes the growing awareness that greater specificity is required to adequately describe and analyze emotional effects [14]. Below, we summarize empirical evidence for social consequences of emotional expressions across different levels of analysis: the interpersonal level (negotiations between individuals negotiating on their own behalf), the intragroup level (negotiations among members of a group), and the intergroup level (negotiations between [representatives of] different groups).

Research has addressed a wide range of emotions, outcomes, and moderators. To facilitate processing, we will interpret findings through the lens of Emotions as Social Information (EASI) theory [10,15]. This theory postulates that emotional expressions can influence

behavioral responses of others (e.g., cooperation or competition) by eliciting affective and/or inferential processes in them. Affective processes involve emotional reactions and/or sentiments about the expresser (e.g., liking or disliking). Inferential processes involve cognitions about the implications of the other's emotional expressions (e.g., inferences about their goals or evaluation of one's behavior). EASI theory posits that the relative influence of affective and inferential processes on behavior depends on the observer's information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression in the context. Specifically, the theory predicts that the impact of (negative) affective reactions on behavioral responses is stronger when the observer is less motivated and/or able to process the implications of another's emotional expression and/or perceives the expression as inappropriate. Conversely, the impact of inferences on behavioral responses is stronger when the observer is more willing and able to engage in thorough information processing and perceives the emotional expression as appropriate.

Review of empirical research

We begin by reviewing the effects of expressions of specific single emotions; next we consider effects of alternative (patterns of) emotional expressions.

Single emotions

Anger. The most commonly investigated emotion in negotiations is anger. Research at the interpersonal level indicates anger is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, expressions of anger can signal to a counterpart that one's limits have been reached [16], communicate toughness [17,18], and instill fear [19,20], all of which can help extract concessions [3] or create value by increasing information search [21]. On the other hand, expressions of anger can elicit reciprocal anger [22] and negative impressions in one's counterpart [23,24], which can fuel competition [25], invite deception [26] and sabotage [27], cause impasse [22,28], and reduce future interaction intentions [23,24].

These contradictory findings can be understood by considering critical moderators of responses to anger expressions suggested by EASI theory [15,29]. Cooperative responses are more likely when targets engage in thorough information processing [3], for instance due to personality [24], low power [18,25,30], a poor reputation [22], or a non-central position [31]. Competitive responses are more likely when targets perceive anger expressions as inappropriate [25], for instance because the expressions violate (cultural) display rules [32,33], targets attach moral value to the issue [34,35], anger is expressed ad-hominem [36] or too early in the negotiation [28], or anger is perceived as inauthentic or manipulative [37–39], for instance when it appears exaggerated [40].

At the intragroup level, anger can spread within negotiating groups to affect group processes and outcomes. In face-to-face groups, a confederate's expressions of "hostile irritability" instigated similar emotions in other group members via emotional contagion [41]. In virtual teams, anger spread among members via text messages [42]. The diffusion of anger can create a negative team climate [43], rendering constructive negotiations more difficult. However, in keeping with EASI theory, expressions of anger can also contribute to conflict resolution. Dissenting group members who faced majority anger inferred they risked rejection [44]. This motivated deviants to conform to the majority's preference when they were insecure about their standing or no alternative group was available, both of which enhance information processing. Research on multi-party negotiations further revealed that negotiators made larger concessions to angry rather than non-angry counterparts when they were forced to form a coalition with them but excluded angry counterparts from the coalition when they had the opportunity [45].

At the intergroup level, research on representative intergroup negotiations demonstrated that representatives who were confronted with expressions of anger (as opposed to happiness) from an outgroup representative conceded more, but only when they occupied a peripheral position within their group and were therefore motivated to carefully process the outgroup's emotions [31]. Observing expressions of anger by an outgroup member can also decrease negative intergroup attitudes through increased intergroup empathy [46]. Furthermore, in violent conflicts, anger expressions by a high-power group led outsiders to legitimize intergroup violence due to perceptions that the group was wronged [47]. These findings indicate that anger can have constructive consequences in negotiations if it is carefully processed and treated as a source of information.

Happiness. Expressions of happiness are conducive to a pleasant atmosphere, but they may also suggest leniency. Several interpersonal studies revealed that expressions of happiness elicited reciprocal happiness [16] and positive impressions [24] in targets. Happiness displays also increased chances of securing a deal [23] and desire for future interaction [24]. At the same time, expressions of happiness can invite competition by signaling low limits [16], particularly when targets process the strategic information signaled by the emotion more thoroughly [24].

Expressions of happiness can also spread within groups via emotional contagion. Group members who faced a

confederate displaying "cheerful enthusiasm" reported experiencing similar emotions themselves [41]. The spreading of happiness, in turn, facilitates coordination [43] and cooperation [41]. Expressions of happiness also enable group members to voice dissenting opinions. Upon noticing fellow group members' happiness, deviant individuals inferred they were unlikely to be rejected, rendering them more willing to advocate their opposing views [44]. Thus, expressions of happiness can create a safe group climate that is conducive to an open exchange of perspectives.

At the intergroup level, representatives who occupied a peripheral position in their group (and therefore processed information more thoroughly) made more competitive demands to a counterpart who expressed happiness during intergroup negotiation than did representatives occupying a central position (who processed information less thoroughly) [31].

Disappointment. Expressions of disappointment, too, can have both favorable and unfavorable consequences. Studies in the interpersonal domain revealed that, on the one hand, disappointment signals that one was hoping for a better outcome, which can elicit concessions [48]. Furthermore, expressions of disappointment can evoke guilt in counterparts, thereby motivating cooperation [19]. On the other hand, expressions of disappointment signal weakness and dependency, which can invite exploitation [49].

Several moderators help explain this paradox. For instance, participants with a selfish and calculative personality were more likely to concede to a disappointed opponent, because they feared that failing to do so might endanger their own outcomes [50]. Conversely, participants low on trust discounted expressions of disappointment, rendering them unresponsive [48]. Finally, negotiators conceded to a disappointed counterpart to the degree that the disappointment made them feel guilty, for instance because the counterpart was an ingroup member [49]. These findings are consistent with EASI theory's tenet that responses to emotional expressions depend on observers' motivation to carefully process those emotional expressions, as shaped here by self-relevance (selfishness, group membership) and trust.

Mirroring findings at the interpersonal level of analysis [49], research at the intergroup level found that expressions of outgroup disappointment elicited guilt [51]. Feelings of guilt, in turn, increased the perceived legitimacy of the outgroup's plight, fostering intentions to cooperate [51]. These findings, too, suggest that deeper processing of a counterpart's disappointment is associated with more constructive responses.

Sadness. Compatible patterns have been obtained for sadness. Sinaceur and colleagues [52] demonstrated that displays of sadness in interpersonal negotiations can engender cooperation when they evoke empathy and compassion. Such affective reactions arose under conditions that facilitate other-concern (and therefore, presumably, emotional attentiveness), namely when targets perceived the expresser as having low power, when they anticipated a future interaction with the expresser, or when they were in a collaborative relationship. Dehgani and colleagues [34] further found that the effects of sadness expressions on concession-making were enhanced when negotiators attached moral significance to the negotiation issue, because this facilitated reciprocal feelings of sorrow.

At the intergroup level, expressions of sadness can foster openness to the other party's perspective [53]. Whereas respondents anticipated that expressions of sadness would work only when shown by lower-power parties, openness was fostered by sadness expressions regardless of parties' power [53].

Fear. Research on intergroup conflict indicates that expressions of fear can solicit support for violence by signaling victimhood. When powerless groups in violent conflict expressed fear, outside observers legitimized the use of violence by that group [47]. Expressions of fear suggested the group was a victim rather than a perpetrator and could not be blamed for their violence, evoking sympathy.

Guilt. Expressions of guilt can repair relationships after a misstep, but they may also invite exploitation. In interpersonal negotiations, targets confronted with a counterpart's guilt perceived the counterpart as interpersonally sensitive but also inferred the counterpart had overclaimed [48]. Consequently, negotiators reinforced their demands, particularly when they had high trust and therefore relied on their counterpart's emotions to inform their strategy.

Shame. Research on intergroup negotiations indicates that expressions of shame can neutralize the consequences of transgressions. When a group's feelings of shame about their behavior in an intergroup game were communicated to the other group, cooperation increased [54]. Relatedly, embodied expressions of remorse improved perceptions of a transgressor, thereby enhancing the positive impact of apologies [55]. Thus, communicating awareness of one's wrongdoing through emotional expressions can reduce the negative consequences of intergroup transgressions.

However, groups embroiled in intractable conflict tend to perceive the outgroup as unable to experience secondary (uniquely human [56]) emotions like shame. Outgroup expressions of such emotions may therefore be perceived as disingenuous. Accordingly, intergroup forgiveness was reduced when transgressor groups

expressed shame, due to decreased trust in its veracity [57]. Likewise, in the absence of reparations, apologies accompanied by shame and guilt yielded less forgiveness and less positive intergroup attitudes than non-emotional expressions [58]. Consistent with EASI theory, these findings indicate that the social consequences of shame depend on the degree to which it is trusted and processed.

Pride. The social consequences of pride in negotiations depend on the nature of the pride. Authentic pride is associated with prestige, whereas hubristic pride is associated with dominance [59]. Reflecting this difference, displays of authentic pride in interpersonal negotiations elicited fairer offers from counterparts than displays of hubristic pride [60].

At the intragroup level, expressions of pride have been shown to signal high status [61]. The different types of pride are associated with different bases of influence in groups, with hubristic pride being linked with dominance and authentic pride with prestige [59]. Thus, expressions of pride influence the negotiation of rank and influence in groups [62].

Pride can also shape the trajectory of intergroup relations. In one study, expressions of pride following a transgression during an intergroup interaction fueled support for punishment [54]. Thus, besides functioning as a status signal, expressions of pride can invite competitive responses in the aftermath of a transgression, presumably because they suggest the expresser does not acknowledge (or care about) negative consequences of their behavior for the other party.

Hope. Research on intergroup relations shows that expressions of hope can spread within groups to shape support for conflict resolution, depending on the nature of the conflict [63]. In a non-political conflict, expressions of hope by an ingroup leader increased group members' experienced hope, and thereby fostered support for a proposed solution. In a political conflict, Leftists responded to a leader's hope expressions with greater support for a resolution, whereas Rightists showed decreased support.

Hope can also directly affect intergroup negotiations. Expressions of hope from outgroup members can fuel perceptions among ingroup members that the outgroup shares the goal of achieving a solution [64]. When outgroup support for peace was low, outgroup hope expressions indicated intentions to support an opportunity for peace and thus increased ingroup members' experienced hope and subsequent agreement acceptance. However, explicit outgroup support diminished the effect of hope expressions, presumably because the informational value of hope displays is reduced when explicit information about support is available.

Alternative emotional patterns

Empathy. Empathy — the vicarious experience of another's emotional state — can facilitate de-escalation. Research showed that expressions of empathy by an outgroup leader toward the ingroup increased conciliatory attitudes, provided the ingroup trusted the outgroup [65]. This reflects EASI's postulate that the social consequences of emotional expressions are modulated by perceivers' information processing, which is shaped (among other things) by trust.

Emotional ambivalence. Emotional ambivalence concerns the simultaneous experience of different emotions about the same issue. Rothman [66] found that expressions of emotional ambivalence invited more dominant behavior from counterparts than expressions of happiness, anger, or no emotion, because expressions of ambivalence triggered inferences of submissiveness. Presumably, the simultaneous experience of different emotions signals uncertainty about how to appraise the situation, suggesting flexibility — a state that can be exploited by a counterpart in competitive negotiations.

Mixed emotions. In multi-issue negotiations, parties may feel differently about different aspects of the negotiation. Expressions of such mixed emotions can facilitate the discovery of integrative ("win—win") solutions. Pietroni and colleagues [67] demonstrated that negotiators inferred from a counterpart's expressions of anger versus happiness associated with different negotiation issues that the counterpart attached relatively high versus low value to the respective issues. When there was integrative potential, these inferences led participants to stand firm on their own high-value issue and concede on the issue that appeared more important to the counterpart, thereby arriving at mutually satisfying solutions. Relatedly, interpersonally mixed emotional expressions (in which different negotiators expressed different emotions) increased joint gains compared to same-emotion dyads [68]. These findings underscore that emotional expressions are a valuable source of information that can be leveraged to enhance negotiation outcomes.

Alternating emotions. Negotiators may also experience different emotions at different timepoints in a negotiation. Filipowicz and colleagues [69] observed that participants conceded more to counterparts who first expressed happiness and later expressed anger than to counterparts who consistently expressed anger or moved from anger to happiness. The switch from happiness to anger elicited situational attributions (i.e., negotiators inferred that the counterpart's emotion responded to their own actions), which motivated concessions. Conversely, steady-state anger elicited dispositional attributions (i.e., participants inferred that the emotion was a result of the counterpart's personality), prompting smaller concessions. Other work [70] revealed that

participants made larger concessions to counterparts who exhibited emotional inconsistency (i.e., alternating several times between expressing anger and happiness) than to counterparts who consistently showed anger or happiness. Participants confronted with an emotionally inconsistent counterpart experienced a sense of unpredictability and lack of control, which led them to give in to the counterpart's demands. These studies demonstrate that the meaning and implications of emotions can change when they are expressed in the context of other emotions, highlighting that exploiting the information conveyed by emotional expressions requires active sense-making.

Indifference. Although not technically an emotional state, explicit expressions of indifference can elicit affective, inferential, and behavioral responses from targets. Cohen-Chen and colleagues [71] found that, besides eliciting negative affective reactions, a counterpart's indifference expressions reduced targets' cooperation by lowering their expectations of the counterpart's future collaboration. Furthermore, the impact of indifference expressions on cooperation via expected collaboration was reduced when the counterpart explicitly indicated cooperative intentions, in which case the indifference expressions became less diagnostic. This fits with EASI's notion that emotional expressions carry valuable information, the use of which depends on negotiators' information processing.

At the intergroup level, Cohen-Chen and colleagues [72] found that, unlike in situations of positive interdependence, in negatively interdependent situations outgroup expressions constituted a positive expectancy violation and invited favorable responses (i.e., reduced negative affective reactions, increased inferences of partner collaboration, increased support for a resolution). Presumably, indifference expressions that positively violate expectations are perceived as more appropriate, resulting in more favorable responses.

Conclusions and future directions

Table 1 summarizes key patterns emerging from our review. The richness and complexity of the empirical record defies simple conclusions as to whether expressing emotions is functional or dysfunctional, whether positive or negative emotional expressions are more conducive to favorable outcomes, and even whether certain emotions are more helpful than others. Still, Table 1 highlights notable recurring patterns, which can be understood through the lens of EASI theory [10,15].

EASI posits that the social consequences of emotional expressions are driven by affective reactions and inferential processes, whose relative strength depends on parties' information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the expressions. Information processing is shaped by numerous factors, including individual dispositions, situational features (e.g., power), and the communication medium [24,73,74]. Perceived appropriateness is shaped by characteristics of the emotional expression, the expresser, the perceiver, and the broader (cultural) context [32,36,38]. As seen in Table 1, research broadly supports these postulates. Thus, by considering affective and inferential processes in conjunction with information processing and perceived appropriateness, we can better understand how emotional expressions shape negotiations.

Table 1 also reveals several imbalances and lacunae in the empirical record, suggesting opportunities for future research. First, some emotions (e.g., anger, happiness, disappointment) have been studied more extensively than others (e.g., fear, guilt, shame). Additional work is needed to map the social consequences of less well-studied emotions. Second, although there is fairly broad evidence for both affective and inferential processes, for various secondary emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, pride) and alternative emotional patterns (e.g., emotional ambivalence, mixed emotions, alternating emotions), inferential processes feature more prominently in the literature than affective processes. Future studies could investigate the affective consequences of these more intricate emotional constellations. Third, research has demonstrated the relevance of perceived appropriateness mostly in relation to expressions of anger, whereas the role of information processing has been established in connection with a wide range of emotions. Future work could examine the role of the perceived appropriateness of other emotions.

The review highlights that, just as carefully weighing one's words is important for negotiation success, calibrating one's emotional expressions is critical too. This poses challenges, because emotional expressions that do not reflect genuine feelings may be perceived as manipulative [38] and unethical — particularly when emotions are exaggerated rather than suppressed [40] —, and emotional expressions that do not comply with (cultural) mandates risk being perceived as inappropriate [32]. This implies that intelligent emotion regulation is crucial to ensuring successful use of emotional expressions in negotiation [75,76], but more research is needed to establish this.

Finally, the theoretical and empirical insights gained to date rely heavily on somewhat contrived experiments that are ideal for isolating effects of interest but not for examining real-world implications. There is a need for research on more intricate dynamics, such as longer-term consequences of emotional expressions [77], effects of divergent expressions from different group

Table 1

Overview of key empirical patterns revealed by the current review, organized in terms of affective and inferential processes, behavioral responses, and overarching moderators (per EASI theory).

	Affective processes	Inferential processes	Behavioral responses/ outcomes	Higher-order moderators
Anger	• Mutual anger • Disliking	• Other is tough/has reached limit • Impending rejection	• Concessions • Retaliation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by personality, power, position) • Perceived appropriateness (e.g., shaped by culture, authenticity)
Happiness	• Mutual happiness • Liking	• Other is lenient • Acceptance	• Exploitation • Coordination	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by personality, power)
Disappointment	• Guilt	• Other had expected/ hoped for more • Other is dependent	• Concessions • Exploitation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by trust, self-relevance)
Sadness	• Empathy/ compassion	• Other is needy	• Cooperation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by expected future interaction)
Fear		• Other is victim/ subordinate party • Violence legitimized		
Guilt		• Other is socially sensitive • Other has claimed too much	• Exploitation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by trust)
Shame			• Apology acceptance	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by perceived genuineness and trust)
Pride		• Other has high status	• Cooperation • Punishment	
Hope	• Mutual hope		• Support for solution	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by informational value)
Empathy			• Conciliation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by trust)
Emotional ambivalence		• Other is submissive	• Dominance	
Mixed emotions		• Other weighs different issues differently • Negotiation has integrative potential	• Logrolling • Joint gains	
Alternating emotions		• Internal vs. external attributions	• Concessions	
Indifference	• Negative affect	• Other is unlikely to cooperate	• Reduced cooperation • Increased cooperation	• Information processing (e.g., shaped by informational value) • Perceived appropriateness (e.g., shaped by positive expectancy violation)

Note. Entries represent interpretable, recurring patterns. Empty cells reflect a lack of empirical research.

members [78], or consequences of emotional expressions across levels of analysis (e.g., how emotions expressed by constituents shape interactions between representative negotiators). In this regard, we also call for more research on the role of emotions in the adjacent fields of mediation [79] and diplomacy [80], which are pertinent to conflict management and international relations in today's explosive world.

Credit author statement

Gerben A. van Kleef: Conceptualization; Funding acquisition; Investigation; Roles/Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing.

Smadar Cohen-Chen: Conceptualization; Investigation; Roles/Writing – original draft; Writing – review & editing.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

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* of special interest
** of outstanding interest

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Further information on references of particular interest

21. ** Rees et al. (2020): This paper shows that expressions of anger can trigger enhanced information search in negotiations. Participants who faced an angry counterpart were more likely to seek diagnostic information about their counterpart's preferences and priorities, which enabled them to attain higher joint outcomes. Extending earlier work on anger and concession-making, these results indicate that anger can be helpful in creating value in integrative negotiations by fostering information seeking.

29. ** Van Kleef & Côté (2022): This paper reviews research on the effects of emotional expressions on the affect, cognition, and behavior of observers in a range of social interactions. The review shows that behavioral reactions to emotional expressions are mediated by affective and inferential processes, the relative weight of which is modulated by observers' information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the expressions within the context. The paper also shows that emotional expressions influence observer responses similarly across modes of expression (i.e., facial, vocal, postural, verbal/written, and pictorial/symbolic).

40. * Kang & Schweitzer (2022): This research examined responses to different types of emotional deception in negotiations. The authors distinguished between up-displayed (exaggerated) and down-displayed (suppressed) emotions, finding that observers judged down-displays of anger, sadness, and happiness more ethical than commensurate up-displays. This finding further illuminates EASI theory's notion of perceived appropriateness by showing that exaggerating emotions is deemed less acceptable than suppressing them.

53. * Gur et al. (2026). This study demonstrates that, in intergroup negotiations, expressions of sadness by another group about their misfortune can foster openness to that group's perspective. This effect was found regardless of the group's relative power. This finding suggests that sadness can be leveraged to enhance intergroup relations.

55. * Hornsey et al. (2020). Apologizing after a misstep can alleviate backlash, but apologies are not always trusted to be genuine. The authors examined whether people respond more positively to public apologies if the apologies are accompanied by nonverbal demonstrations of remorse (e.g., kneeling, crying). They found that embodied expressions of remorse had favorable effects on the perceived likelihood of reoffending, empathy, perceptions of the transgressor, and satisfaction with the apology, although they did not affect forgiveness.

60. * Kusano & Kemmelmeier (2025): This research examined how postural expressions of power affect perceptions of distinct types of pride, leading to differential offers in negotiations. Prestige was conveyed by adding a smile and upward face-tilt to an expansive posture of power. This was compared to dominance, which involved a power posture with a threatening downward face-tilt and no accompanying smile. Prestige displays conveyed authentic pride to observers, leading to larger offers compared to dominance displays, which fueled perceptions of hubristic pride. These findings emphasize the importance of a nuanced approach to examining the effects of specific emotional expressions and the distinct messages they convey in negotiations.

63. ** Cohen-Chen et al. (2019): This paper addresses the effects of intragroup expressions of hope in intergroup conflicts. Across different types of conflict, the authors demonstrated that expressions of hope by a leader can mobilize support for conflict resolution by instilling reciprocal hope in group members. The results further suggested that political Leftists are more susceptible to hope expressions than political Rightists.

71. * Cohen-Chen et al. (2022): This paper was the first to examine the effects of expressions of indifference, that is, the explicit absence of an emotional response where such a response might be expected. Drawing on Emotions as Social Information (EASI) theory, the authors demonstrated that expressions of indifference can trigger negative affective reactions as well as inferences of low future collaboration in targets, both of which undermined targets' cooperation. The findings demonstrate that expressing indifference has qualitatively different consequences than expressing no emotion.